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Intellectualism and Testimony 
Yuri Cath 
Penultimate draft—forthcoming in Analysis  
1. Testimony Objections  
I do not know how to ride a bike (really).1 Suppose a friend, who is trustworthy and a keen 
cyclist, takes pity on me and tells me how to do it. Will I thereby come to know how to ride a 
bike? Unfortunately, learning how to ride a bike is not that easy. As Poston (2015) discusses, 
it seems to be a datum that inferences like the following are bad inferences: 
Bad 
(1) Bill knows how to ride a bike. 
(2) Bill tells Hannah how to ride a bike. 
So, (3) Hannah knows how to ride a bike. 
Similarly, Carter and Pritchard (2015: 810) discuss an example involving Roger who wants to 
know how to play David’s special guitar riff. David, who is trustworthy and an expert 
guitarist, tells Roger how to play the riff (by telling him the complex finger movements 
involved and describing the precise way to use the ‘whammy bar’). Carter and Pritchard 
(henceforth ‘C&P’) suggest that as a result Roger could come to “know that way w is the way 
to play David’s signature riff” (2015: 810), but he would not come to know how to play this 
riff.  
These examples suggest that the practical knowledge attributed by knowledge-how-to 
ascriptions (or “practical knowledge” for short) is difficult to transmit via testimony (even if 
we assume that standard conditions for the transmission of testimony are in place). However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I would learn but—like David Lewis (1998) and vegemite—why ruin a good example? 
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knowledge-wh and knowledge-that appear to be easy to transmit via testimony (assuming, 
again, that standard conditions for the transmission of testimony are in place). If Roger also 
wants to know who David’s favourite guitarist is, when David will be performing, why David 
will be performing, or where David is performing, then he can easily gain such knowledge by 
David simply telling him who his favourite guitarist is, or when he will be performing, etc. 
And Hannah can easily come to know that Bill’s bike has a flat tire from Bill’s testimony that 
it does.  
Does this contrast provide us with a good objection to intellectualism, the view that practical 
knowledge is a kind of knowledge-that? C&P (2015) and Poston (2015) both claim that it 
does,2 and it is easy to see why. Intellectualists typically hold that knowing how to ɸ is a kind 
of knowledge-wh, which, like other forms of knowledge-wh, can be analysed in terms of 
knowing a proposition that answers its embedded question (see e.g. Brogaard 2009, Stanley 
and Williamson 2001, and Stanley 2011a, 2011b). However, the above examples seem to 
point to an important difference between practical knowledge and both knowledge-wh and 
knowledge-that, a difference that might be significant enough to conclude that intellectualism 
is false. The aim of this article is to show how an intellectualist can resist such objections by 
contesting the idea that practical knowledge is difficult to transmit via testimony.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See also Zagzebski (2009: 145) for a related argument concerning understanding how to ɸ. 
3 Alternatively, one might try to contest the other side of the disanalogy claim. There are cases that suggest that 
some forms of knowledge-wh can be difficult to transmit, including knowing-where-to (Stanley 2011a), and 
knowing-what-it-is-like (Lewis 1998, Paul 2014). And, nonetheless, some philosophers still maintain that these 
forms of knowing-wh should be analysed in terms of knowing-that (for related discussion see e.g. Lycan 1996, 
Stanley 2011a, and Stoljar 2016). One could appeal to these points to support a similar position with respect to 
practical knowledge (i.e. that it is a kind of knowledge-that but one that can be difficult to transmit via 
testimony). However, such a response would be dialectically tricky and I will not pursue it here. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for this journal for helpful discussion. 
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2. An Intellectualist Response 
C&P and Poston assume that in their respective cases the speaker possesses (but just cannot 
transmit) the relevant practical knowledge that the hearer would need to possess in order to 
know how to perform the relevant action. But this assumption is highly contestable. To see 
why, it will help to distinguish the different ways of disambiguating a ‘S knows how to ɸ’ 
ascription like (3) above (following Stanley and Williamson 2001): 
(3a) For some way w, Hannah knows that w is a way that Hannah could ride a bike. 
(3b) For some way w, Hannah knows that w is a way that one could ride a bike. 
(3c) For some way w, Hannah knows that w is a way that Hannah ought to ride a bike. 
(3d) For some way w, Hannah knows that w is a way that one ought to ride a bike. 
These different interpretations stem from different readings of: (i) the covert pronoun (or 
‘PRO’) in (3), which can be interpreted as a generic ‘one’ or as anaphoric on the main subject 
(i.e. Hannah); and (ii) the modality of the infinitival ‘to ride a bike’, which can be given 
either a deontic interpretation (‘ought’) or a non-deontic interpretation (‘could’).  
Intellectualists identify practical knowledge with the knowledge attributed by the 
disambiguation of (3) where the infinitive is given its non-deontic interpretation and ‘PRO’ is 
anaphoric on the main subject, which is represented above as (3a).4 But, as Stanley (2011b) 
discusses, while the infinitives in (3) and (3a) have the same force (they are both dispositional 
or ability modals) they will likely be interpreted via distinct modal parameters: 
In [3a], the modal parameter is one that takes the world of evaluation, and yields a set of propositions 
that characterize Hannah’s physical state after training for some time with a bicycle. In contrast, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Intellectualists allow that there can be contexts in which (3) will be interpreted instead as (3b), (3c) or (3d). 
The idea here is not that (3) has to be interpreted as (3a), only that (3a) is the right interpretation to focus on 
when we are interested in the practical knowledge at stake in the debates between intellectualists and anti-
intellectualists. And anti-intellectualists often agree with this point (see e.g. Poston 2015: 2). 
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natural modal parameter for the envisaged utterance of [3] is one that takes the world of evaluation, and 
yields a set of propositions that characterize Hannah’s physical state at the moment. That is why the 
two utterances express different propositions—because the modals in the two sentences are interpreted 
via distinct modal parameters. (Stanley 2011b: 126)  
Stanley’s ideas here can be usefully represented as the suggestion that (3a) is most naturally 
interpreted as something like (3e) whereas the relevant interpretation of (3) is actually closer 
to something like (3f): 
(3e) For some way w, Hannah knows that w is a way Hannah could ride a bike in 
circumstances where she is in the physical state she would be in after training to ride a 
bike. 
 (3f) For some way w, Hannah knows that w is a way Hannah could ride a bike in 
circumstances where she is in her normal physical state.5  
The problem for Poston is that it does not follow from Bill’s knowing how to ride a bike that 
he knows that that way is a way in which Hannah could ride a bicycle in circumstances 
where she is in her normal physical state. And if we assume that Hannah has never trained to 
ride a bike (which is the most natural way of interpreting the scenario), then it will not be the 
case that Hannah can ride a bike that way in her normal physical state. In which case, Bill 
cannot know this proposition about Hannah’s abilities because this proposition is false.6 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Following ideas in Hawley (2003), Stanley goes on to clarify that the modal parameter for the relevant 
interpretation of knowledge-how-to ascriptions takes the world of evaluation and yields a set of propositions 
specifying the subject’s “physical condition under normal circumstances” (2011b: 128). In the quote above, 
Stanley is imagining that Hannah’s current circumstances are normal but, as he discusses, that will not always 
be the case (e.g. if Hannah is injured).  
6 We could imagine the scenario differently such that Bill fails to know the relevant proposition about what 
Hannah can do in normal circumstances for other reasons. For example, that the proposition is true but Bill fails 
to know it because he does not believe it, or does not justifiably believe it, etc. The point here is just that on the 
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shows us that Poston’s argument against intellectualism is based on a false presupposition, 
namely, that if (1) is true then Bill possesses the practical knowledge that Hannah seeks. This 
point can be made explicit by replacing (1) and (3) of Bad with their interpretations as (1f) 
and (3f): 
(1f) For some way w, Bill knows that w is a way Bill could ride a bike in 
circumstances where he is in his normal physical state.  
(2) Bill tells Hannah how to ride a bike.  
So, (3f) For some way w, Hannah knows that w is a way Hannah could ride a bike in 
circumstances where she is in her normal physical state. 
It is worth emphasizing that, given this interpretation of (1) and (3), the inference is bad no 
matter what kind of speech act we imagine Bill as performing when he tells Hannah how to 
ride a bicycle. Consider the following interpretations we might give for (2) in line with the 
previous disambiguations of (3) into (3a)-(3d): 
(2a) For some way w, Bill tells Hannah that w is a way that Hannah could ride a bike. 
(2b) For some way w, Bill tells Hannah that w is a way that one could ride a bike. 
(2c) For some way w, Bill tells Hannah that w is a way that Hannah ought to ride a 
bike. 
(2d) For some way w, Bill tells Hannah that w is a way that one ought to ride a bike. 
If Bill performs any of the speech acts described in (2b)-(2d) he tells Hannah something true 
and something he could know to be true. However, in each case Bill would not have told 
Hannah the kind of proposition she needs to know in order for (3f) to be true. And the same 
point applies if Bill tells Hannah that w is a way that Bill could, or ought to, ride a bike. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
most natural interpretation of this bike scenario (where Hannah has never trained to ride a bike) the relevant 
proposition will fail to be known because it is false. 
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Imagine instead then that Bill says to Hannah “this is a way you can ride a bike” (perhaps as 
he demonstrates that way by riding his bike). It follows that (2a) is correct but Bill’s utterance 
could be interpreted in at least two different ways depending on the modal parameter used to 
interpret his use of ‘could’, giving us the following interpretations of (2) corresponding to 
(3e) and (3f): 
(2e) For some way w, Bill tells Hannah that w is a way Hannah could ride a bike in 
circumstances where she is in the physical state she would be in after training to ride a 
bike. 
 (2f) For some way w, Bill tells Hannah that w is a way Hannah could ride a bike in 
circumstances where she is in her normal physical state. 
If we interpret Bill’s utterance in a way that gives us (2e) (which would be the most natural 
interpretation) then Bill says something true (for Hannah could ride a bike in that way after 
training to do so), and something he could know to be true. In which case, Hannah could gain 
this knowledge from Bill’s testimony (if she did not have it already). The problem is, again, 
that Hannah would not thereby possess the knowledge she needs in order for (3f) to be true, 
which is the knowledge the intellectualist identifies with practical knowledge.  
Suppose instead then that we interpret Bill’s utterance in a way that gives us (2f). Bill would 
thereby have told Hannah a proposition of the right form but he would be saying something 
false. If Hannah has not yet trained to ride a bicycle, then she has not yet developed the 
relevant dispositions and skills required for her to succeed in riding a bike in that way in her 
normal physical state, and merely listening to Bill’s testimony won’t help her to acquire those 
dispositions. However, we choose to interpret (2) then the point remains that Bill lacks the 
knowledge that Hannah seeks, and Hannah will lack this knowledge both before and after 
Bill’s testimony. 
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Similarly, in C&P’s guitar case, David does not possess the practical knowledge that Roger 
would have to possess in order for the relevant interpretation of ‘Roger knows how to play 
David’s signature guitar riff’ to be true. For the relevant way to play David’s signature riff is 
not a way that Roger could play the riff in his normal physical state, given that he has not yet 
trained himself to perform the relevant finger movements etc.  
Importantly, the reply here to such cases is very different from one that says that Bill and 
David cannot transmit their practical knowledge because that knowledge involves some 
special mode of presentation (a reply suggested by Hawley 2010 and Stanley 2011b: 129). 
C&P (2015: 811-814) and Poston (2015: 10-12) both criticize replies of that kind. But those 
criticisms are irrelevant here. The reply here does rely on the idea that in possessing practical 
knowledge one knows a proposition that is about oneself and what one can do in normal 
circumstances.7 But it does not rely on the idea that such a proposition will involve some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This idea may seem to be in tension with Stanley and Williamson’s (2001: 416) claim that a pianist who loses 
her hands in an accident would know how to play the piano but lack the ability to do so.  Stanley (2011b: 128) 
tries to avoid such concerns by appealing to the fact that modals are highly context sensitive and, as such, the 
explicit modal in an ‘S can [/has the ability to] ɸ’ ascription might be interpreted via a distinct modal parameter 
from the implicit ability modal in the corresponding ‘S knows how to ɸ’ ascription. Stanley (2011b: 128) 
suggests that the pianist “is no longer able to play the piano” because this explicit ability modal is interpreted via 
a modal parameter “that is determined by how things are at the actual world” but she knows how to play the 
piano because there is a way such that she “knows that it is a way that she could play the piano in…normal 
situations in which she had arms” (my emphasis). Stanley could also claim that while an ‘S knows how to ɸ’ 
ascription does not entail an unqualified ‘S can [/has the ability to] ɸ’ ascription it still entails a qualified ‘S can 
[/has the ability to] ɸ in normal circumstances’ ascription because the qualification shifts the modal parameter to 
match that of the implicit modal in the ‘S knows how to ɸ’ ascription (and he seems to rely on this idea in the 
previous quote). For discussion of related issues (from a somewhat different perspective) see Glick (2013: 556-
558). Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for pressing me to clarify this issue. 
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special first-personal way of thinking of oneself, or practical mode of presentation, such that 
this knowledge cannot be transferred via testimony.8 
Indeed, I think it is plausible that Bill could transfer the knowledge attributed to him by (1f) 
to Hannah via his testimony. Similarly, if Hannah could ride a bike in her normal physical 
circumstances then, in principle, Bill could know that and thereby possess the knowledge 
attributed to Hannah by (3f). But Hannah cannot do that. And the knowledge attributed to 
Bill by (1f) is not the knowledge Hannah needs to possess in order for (3f) to be true. The 
problem with Bad is not that Bill possesses the practical knowledge that Hannah seeks but is 
unable to transfer that knowledge to her because his knowledge involves some special mode 
of presentation. The problem is that Bill simply fails to possess this knowledge altogether.  
3. Other Applications  
There are cases where it seems that practical knowledge transmits easily.  Consider the 
following inference: 
(4) Bill knows how to open the door. 
(5) Bill tells Hannah how to open the door.   
So, (6) Hannah knows how to open the door. 
This inference, in contrast to Bad, looks fine. A nice feature of the intellectualist response I 
have offered to cases like Bad is that it can also explain this difference. Suppose the way to 
open the door is to enter the code 4359 and pull the handle up. If Hannah has normal 
cognitive and physical capacities, and relevant past experiences (e.g. of opening other similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It may turn out that, for other reasons, the best version of intellectualism is one that appeals to special modes of 
presentation. What matters here is that such an appeal is not needed to reply to these testimony objections. 
Similar issues arise in relation to insufficiency objections to intellectualism; see Stanley (2011b: 126-127) and 
Glick (2013: 556-558) for related discussion.  
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doors), then it will already be true that she can open the door in that way in her normal 
physical state. Unlike the action of riding a bike, Hannah does not need to develop any new 
dispositions or skills in order for it to be true that she could open a door in that way in her 
normal physical state. And Bill could easily know this truth about Hannah and share this 
knowledge with her via his testimony.9  
4. Conclusions  
I submit that testimony poses no special problems for intellectualism. For the intellectualist 
can maintain that the cases where it appears that practical knowledge cannot be transmitted 
have been misinterpreted. In such examples the speaker does know how to ɸ in virtue of 
knowing the right proposition about what they can do in normal circumstances. But the 
speaker does not know the corresponding proposition about what the hearer can do in normal 
circumstances that the hearer would have to know in order to know how to ɸ. It is this fact 
that explains the failure of the hearer to gain practical knowledge from the speaker, not any 
failure of the speaker to transmit their knowledge.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Poston (2015: 6) acknowledges that there are cases where it seems that practical knowledge is easily 
transmitted and he gives an example involving testimony about how to tie a Bimini Twist (a type of knot). 
Poston tries to defuse the challenge that this case poses to his views by suggesting that actually only deontic 
knowledge about how one ought to tie a Bimini is transmitted from speaker to hearer in his case. However, even 
if Poston’s assessment of his case is correct the parallel assessment of the door case looks implausible, for the 
reasons just given. 
10 My thanks to audiences at Soochow University (at the 2016 Soochow International Workshop on “Knowledge 
and Action”) and Wuhan University for their feedback on related talks, and to two anonymous referees for this 
journal for valuable suggestions. This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the 
John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. 
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